> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.0xinsider.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Verify a webhook > Activate a webhook after your receiver accepts a signed verification challenge. Use [Start webhook verification](/api-reference/endpoint/create-webhook-verification-attempt) and poll its status when you want a durable asynchronous result. This route keeps its synchronous behavior and waits for the receiver. Verify your endpoint after [creating it](/api-reference/endpoint/create-webhook) or [changing its URL](/api-reference/endpoint/update-webhook). The request needs the one-time `verification_token`, and your receiver must answer the signed challenge with a `2xx` response. The token must match the endpoint and be less than 24 hours old. Until verification succeeds, the endpoint receives no events. ## Parameters | Parameter | Description | | - | - | | `id` | The endpoint to verify. | | `verification_token` | The one-time token from the create response, or from the response to the `url` change. It starts with `whv_`. | ## The challenge 0xinsider sends one signed `POST` to the endpoint's stored `url`. It follows no redirects, allows 10 seconds for your answer, and never reads your response body. | Part | Value | | - | - | | Body | `{"type":"webhook.verification","token":"","webhook_id":}` | | `x-0xinsider-event-type` | `webhook.verification` | | `x-0xinsider-timestamp` | The time the challenge was signed, in Unix seconds. | | `x-0xinsider-signature` | `v1=`, the HMAC-SHA256 of `.` keyed with the endpoint's current `signing_secret`. | | Your answer | Any `2xx`, within 10 seconds. | Check the signature the way you check a delivery, and reject a timestamp more than 5 minutes old. A staged rotation does not change this: the challenge carries one signature, from the current secret. ## Example ```bash theme={null} curl -X POST \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $OXINSIDER_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"verification_token": "whv_3c2e...redacted"}' \ "https://api.0xinsider.com/api/v1/webhooks/42/verify" ``` ## When it fails | Answer | What it means | What to do | | - | - | - | | `400`, `error.param` `verification_token` | The token does not match this endpoint, or it is over 24 hours old. | Send a different `url` to [Update a webhook](/api-reference/endpoint/update-webhook) for a fresh token, or delete the endpoint and create it again. | | `422`, `error.param` `url` | Your destination answered outside `2xx`, took longer than 10 seconds, or is not reachable at a public address. `error.message` says which of the three happened. | Fix the destination, then send the same token again. The endpoint stays at `pending_verification` in the meantime. | A success sets `verified_at`, sets `status` to `active`, and resets `failure_count` to 0. ## What it does not do * Refresh an expired token. Only a `url` change through [Update a webhook](/api-reference/endpoint/update-webhook) issues a new one, and sending the URL the endpoint already has does not count as a change. * Read an `Idempotency-Key`. This route does not take one, so a retry sends the challenge again. * Return `signing_secret`. You have it from create, or from the response that rotated it. * Repeat your destination's response body or its resolved IP address in the error. Neither reaches you or the logs. ## OpenAPI ````yaml POST /api/v1/webhooks/{id}/verify openapi: 3.1.0 info: x-generated-rate-limit-policy-from: web/src/lib/rate-limit-facts.ts via web/scripts/generate-api-policy.ts title: 0xinsider API description: >- Follow provider-exposed large-trade activity from Polymarket. Polymarket wallet-attributed trades can add grades, P&L, strategy, and diagnostic-score context when sufficient source data exists. Fields can be null or unavailable. Normal API requests use a 30-second server timeout that returns HTTP 408 Request Timeout with the standard error envelope (error.code request_timeout) when exceeded. Every /api/v1 failure answers that envelope, including a body that is not JSON or does not fit the request schema (400 invalid_body), a query or path value that does not parse (400 invalid_query, invalid_path), a missing Content-Type: application/json (415 unsupported_media_type), a body over 1048576 bytes (413 payload_too_large) and a method the path does not serve (405 method_not_allowed), each with error.param naming the field where one is known and meta.request_id equal to X-Request-Id. Unknown query names are ignored by default and reported in X-Query-Ignored, while X-Effective-Query lists the normalized names and values applied using form-urlencoded decoding, where + is a space; strict mode returns 400 bad_request with error.reason unknown_query_parameter before the handler runs, including for an unknown name with an incomplete percent escape. Every list operation clamps an out-of-range limit into its published minimum..maximum instead of refusing it (limit=0 reads one row, limit=500 reads the maximum), and X-Effective-Query reports the clamped value; only a limit that is not an integer is refused, with 400 invalid_query. Public REST /api/v1/* endpoints, excluding /api/v1/mcp, use Bearer-token based non-credentialed browser CORS: any Origin may call with Authorization, Content-Type, If-None-Match, Idempotency-Key, Mcp-Session-Id, Mcp-Protocol-Version, Last-Event-Id, and X-Query-Validation request headers. X-Query-Validation: strict opts into rejecting unknown query names; the default remains compatible. Remote MCP at /api/v1/mcp is non-credentialed, but still validates Origin against the 0xinsider/localhost allowlist per MCP Streamable HTTP DNS-rebinding guidance. Successful browser CORS preflight responses advertise Access-Control-Max-Age: 86400. Browser JavaScript may read RateLimit-Limit, RateLimit-Remaining, RateLimit-Reset, the legacy X-RateLimit-Limit, X-RateLimit-Remaining, X-RateLimit-Reset, Retry-After, ETag, X-Request-Id, X-Request-Cost, X-Usage-Accounting, X-Batch-RateLimit-Limit, X-Batch-RateLimit-Remaining, X-Batch-RateLimit-Reset, Mcp-Session-Id, X-Mcp-Error-Code, X-Query-Ignored, and X-Effective-Query response headers. Rate-limit headers describe the budget a request was counted against: the API key's per-minute window on an authenticated call, and the per-IP budget on a public route or on a refused credential (401, 402, 403, 423), so a client looping on a bad or lapsed key still sees how much room it has. Conditional GET: these operations return a weak ETag and answer If-None-Match with 304 Not Modified and an empty body: GET /api/v1/health, GET /api/v1/insider-radar, GET /api/v1/insider-radar/{id}, GET /api/v1/large-positions, GET /api/v1/leaderboard, GET /api/v1/leaderboard/trending, GET /api/v1/market/{condition_id}/candles, GET /api/v1/market/{condition_id}/flow, GET /api/v1/market/{condition_id}/intel, GET /api/v1/market/{condition_id}/snapshot, GET /api/v1/markets/explore, GET /api/v1/markets/sharp-money-flows, GET /api/v1/markets/smart-money-flows, GET /api/v1/pick-of-the-day, GET /api/v1/pick-of-the-day/archive, GET /api/v1/positions, GET /api/v1/sports-edge-observations, GET /api/v1/sports-edge-signals, GET /api/v1/trader/{address}, GET /api/v1/trader/{address}/context, GET /api/v1/trader/{address}/pnl, GET /api/v1/trader/{address}/position-timeline, GET /api/v1/traders/{trader}/position-timeline, GET /api/v1/large-trades, GET /api/v1/large-trades/history, GET /api/v1/large-trades/{id}, GET /api/v1/whale-trades, GET /api/v1/whale-trades/history, GET /api/v1/whale-trades/{id}, GET /api/v1/whale-trades/{id}/counterparties/executions, GET /api/v1/whale-trades/{id}/counterparties/executions/{execution_id}/makers. Credentialed first-party routes such as /api/keys, /api/billing, and auth endpoints remain restricted to configured 0xinsider origins. Protected V1 responses, except the zero-cost /api/v1/usage route, after handler execution carry X-Usage-Accounting: persisted, failed, or unknown. This reports the usage-record write; it does not change the handler result. Do not replay a successful mutation to repair an unknown usage record. Before execution, unavailable accounting capacity returns HTTP 503 with error.reason=request_accounting_unavailable; honor Retry-After. Public API responses add the browser-readable Server-Timing header: Processing time in milliseconds, for example api;dur=12.345. Includes API authentication, quota admission, handler work and response construction. Excludes network transit and streamed body or export-file transfer. The engineering budget is strictly below 250 ms; this header reports observations, not a latency guarantee or a new timeout. Requests through https://0xinsider.com/api/* append Server-Timing: web_api;dur= and X-Web-Request-Id for that web origin handler. The web clock includes upstream waiting and existing body construction, so do not add it to api;dur. It excludes platform routing, cold module initialization, CDN hits and later stream/file transfer. On a cache hit these headers describe the earlier origin fill, not the current request; static Markdown API routes have no fresh web clock. version: 1.0.0 contact: name: 0xinsider email: support@0xinsider.com url: https://0xinsider.com servers: - url: https://api.0xinsider.com description: >- Production (live data). Authenticate with a live key (oxi_sk_live_...); requires an active Pro subscription. A sandbox key (oxi_sk_test_...) is answered with 401 invalid_api_key and error.reason sandbox_api_key. - url: https://0xinsider.com/sandbox description: >- Sandbox. No credential required and no production data: every documented operation answers with its documented example or a deterministic sample of its response schema. GET /api/v1/stream is the one exclusion and answers 400 there, because a Server-Sent Events stream is a live connection rather than a body. Add ?sandbox_status= to receive one of the error responses the operation documents (for example 429 with Retry-After). Documented query parameters and JSON request bodies are checked against this document, the two context.md routes answer 200 text/markdown, GET /api/v1/trader/{address}/export/download answers its 302 with a Location the sandbox serves itself rather than an object store, and nothing is stored between requests. A sandbox key (oxi_sk_test_..., issued with no account by POST https://api.0xinsider.com/api/v1/agents/register) is optional: on an operation that requires a credential, a well-formed key is answered with X-Oxi-Sandbox-Key: valid and a malformed one with 401 invalid_api_key. security: - bearerAuth: [] - oauth2: - read tags: - name: Traders description: Traders, batch lookups, timelines, and export readiness. - name: Positions description: Current prediction-market position snapshots from backend-owned mirrors. - name: Large Positions description: Largest current open positions from graded traders (Polymarket-only). - name: Large trades description: Recent and historical large trades. - name: Leaderboard description: Ranked trader discovery and category/strategy leaderboards. - name: Pick of the Day description: >- One sourced sharp-money call a day: the side profitable wallets are backing, with pre-game odds, the holders, and the track record. - name: Games description: >- Sports and esports games: both sides, schedules, provider status and the Polymarket markets linked to each game. - name: Markets description: Market search, discovery, snapshots, and sharp-money flow. - name: Content description: Search across 0xinsider editorial content. - name: Suspicious trades description: Trades whose recorded suspicion score meets the live flag threshold. - name: Insider Radar description: >- Deprecated spelling of Suspicious trades; both operations stay live as aliases. - name: Events description: Durable public event replay streams. - name: Streaming description: Resumable real-time Server-Sent Events stream of live feed envelopes. - name: Webhooks description: Signed builder webhook destinations and delivery controls. - name: Usage description: Developer API budget and usage introspection. - name: Onboarding description: >- Self-serve agent registration: a sandbox key with no account, and the path to live access. - name: System description: Health and operational status checks. - name: MCP description: Remote Model Context Protocol transport. - name: Reports description: Daily, weekly, monthly, and trader export report snapshots. - name: Account description: Identify the account and credential authenticated for a paid API request. externalDocs: description: 0xinsider API docs url: https://docs.0xinsider.com paths: /api/v1/webhooks/{id}/verify: post: tags: - Webhooks summary: Verify a builder webhook destination description: >- Activates a pending webhook destination. Two conditions must both hold: the one-time verification token matches and has not expired, AND the destination answers 2xx to a signed challenge this operation POSTs to the endpoint's stored url. The challenge body is {"type":"webhook.verification","token":"","webhook_id":}. It carries x-0xinsider-event-type: webhook.verification plus the same x-0xinsider-timestamp and x-0xinsider-signature headers a delivery carries, signed with that endpoint's signing_secret, so verify it exactly as you verify a delivery. Answer any 2xx within 10 seconds; the challenge response body is never read, and the challenge follows no redirects. A status outside 2xx, no answer within 10 seconds, or a url that does not resolve to a publicly routable address leaves status at pending_verification and returns 422. The token alone never activates an endpoint. operationId: verifyWebhook parameters: - name: X-Query-Validation in: header required: false description: >- Opt into strict query-name validation. The default is compatible: unknown names are ignored and reported in X-Query-Ignored. With strict, an unknown name returns 400 bad_request with error.reason unknown_query_parameter before the handler runs, including when its percent escape is incomplete. schema: type: string enum: - strict - name: id in: path required: true description: Webhook endpoint id owned by the authenticated API key user. schema: type: integer format: int64 requestBody: description: One-time verification token for the pending webhook. required: true content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/VerifyWebhookRequest' example: verification_token: whv_example responses: '200': description: Webhook destination content: application/json: schema: type: object required: - object - data - meta properties: object: type: string const: webhook data: $ref: '#/components/schemas/WebhookEndpoint' meta: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ResponseMeta' examples: success: summary: Challenge answered; the endpoint is active value: object: webhook data: id: 1 object: webhook name: Production webhook url: https://example.com/0xinsider/webhook event_types: - whale_trades_inserted trade_filters: {} status: active verified_at: '2026-09-22T03:16:02.417210Z' verification_token_expires_at: '2026-09-23T03:14:44.903437Z' failure_count: 0 created_at: '2026-09-22T03:14:42.182366Z' updated_at: '2026-09-22T03:16:02.417210Z' retry_policy: max_attempts: 8 terminal_status: dead_letter retry_horizon_seconds: 7380 disable_after_consecutive_failures: 8 secret_rotation: status: idle overlap_expires_at: null meta: request_id: req_example cached: false cost: 1 headers: X-Query-Ignored: $ref: '#/components/headers/X-Query-Ignored' X-Effective-Query: $ref: '#/components/headers/X-Effective-Query' X-Usage-Accounting: $ref: '#/components/headers/X-Usage-Accounting' RateLimit-Limit: $ref: '#/components/headers/RateLimit-Limit' RateLimit-Remaining: $ref: '#/components/headers/RateLimit-Remaining' RateLimit-Reset: $ref: '#/components/headers/RateLimit-Reset' X-RateLimit-Limit: $ref: '#/components/headers/X-RateLimit-Limit' X-RateLimit-Remaining: $ref: '#/components/headers/X-RateLimit-Remaining' X-RateLimit-Reset: $ref: '#/components/headers/X-RateLimit-Reset' X-Request-Id: $ref: '#/components/headers/X-Request-Id' Server-Timing: $ref: '#/components/headers/Server-Timing' '400': description: Invalid request parameter content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '401': description: Missing or invalid API key content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '402': description: >- Active Pro subscription required. The key is valid but the account has no active Pro subscription; error.reason is subscription_inactive and error.message names the reactivation URL (https://0xinsider.com/billing). Permanent until a person reactivates: no Retry-After, never retry on a schedule. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '403': description: Account access denied content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '404': description: Resource not found content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '408': description: >- The handler did not answer inside the server's 30-second timeout. error.code is request_timeout. On GET and HEAD the response carries Retry-After and error.retry_at; on a mutation it carries neither, because the request may have completed on the server: check its state before repeating it, and reuse its Idempotency-Key. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '413': description: >- The request body is over 1048576 bytes. error.code is bad_request, error.reason is payload_too_large and error.param is body. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '415': description: >- The body was not sent as Content-Type: application/json. error.code is bad_request, error.reason is unsupported_media_type and error.param is content-type. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '422': description: >- The destination did not pass the verification challenge, so status stays pending_verification and no event is ever delivered to it. error.code is bad_request and error.param is url; error.message names which outcome occurred: the destination answered a status outside 2xx, it did not answer within the 10-second challenge budget, or its url did not resolve to a publicly routable address. The destination's response body and its resolved address are never echoed. Retry with the same token once the destination answers the challenge. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '423': description: Account is locked content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '429': description: >- Rate limit exceeded. Three independent budgets. (1) 100 requests/minute per user (sliding window), on every authenticated route. (2) On the BATCH routes only: 2500 batch item units/minute per user, reserved before any item is executed. A batch with N requested items costs N item units, including duplicate and invalid items. 2500 = 100 requests x 25 items per batch, which is the most item work a key can buy through the request limiter at all: a caller may spend their entire 100-request minute on full 25-item batches without the item budget being what stops them. The REQUEST budget is the effective ceiling, and batching is never the more expensive choice. The item budget can still deny at a sliding-window boundary (both counters carry the previous window forward with a floor, and the item counter runs 25x the request counter), so honor a 429 from either. Over-quota batches return 429 with Retry-After plus RateLimit-Limit, RateLimit-Remaining, and RateLimit-Reset before any item work is done. (3) The monthly quota: Pro includes 500,000 and Max includes 2,000,000 authenticated requests per UTC calendar month. Over the plan's included requests: with pay as you go on, the excess bills at USD 0.20 per 1,000 on a monthly invoice, up to four times the included allowance (2,000,000 requests for Pro); without it, from October 1, 2026, the next request answers 429 rate_limited with error.reason monthly_quota_exceeded and a Retry-After to the month's reset. Pay-as-you-go accounts receive the same refusal at their ceiling. A refused request is not counted. Every authenticated response carries X-Monthly-Quota-Limit, X-Monthly-Quota-Remaining, and X-Monthly-Quota-Reset (unix seconds, the first of next month). (4) The per-address budget: 1200 requests/minute per IP, shared by every caller behind one address and counted before authentication, on every route. A 429 from it carries error.reason ip_rate_limited and describes that bucket in RateLimit-*; a throttled address (sustained over-limit traffic) carries error.reason ip_throttled with a Retry-After of minutes to days, and a request before it does not shorten the cooldown. Every 429 is the standard error envelope with meta.request_id equal to X-Request-Id. headers: Retry-After: description: Seconds until rate limit resets. schema: type: integer RateLimit-Limit: $ref: '#/components/headers/RateLimit-Limit' RateLimit-Remaining: $ref: '#/components/headers/RateLimit-Remaining' RateLimit-Reset: $ref: '#/components/headers/RateLimit-Reset' X-RateLimit-Limit: schema: type: integer X-RateLimit-Remaining: schema: type: integer X-RateLimit-Reset: schema: type: integer X-Request-Id: schema: type: string content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '500': description: Unexpected server error content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' '503': description: >- Redis-backed authenticated rate limiter unavailable; retry after the per-process outage cooldown headers: Retry-After: description: >- Seconds until the middleware will probe the Redis-backed rate limiter again. schema: type: integer X-Request-Id: schema: type: string content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiError' security: - bearerAuth: [] - oauth2: - webhooks x-codeSamples: - lang: curl label: cURL source: |- curl -sS \ -X POST \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $OXINSIDER_API_KEY" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"verification_token":"whv_example"}' \ 'https://api.0xinsider.com/api/v1/webhooks/{id}/verify' components: schemas: VerifyWebhookRequest: type: object required: - verification_token properties: verification_token: type: string description: >- The one-time token returned on create or on a url change. It is necessary but not sufficient: the destination must also answer the signed webhook.verification challenge with a 2xx. WebhookEndpoint: type: object required: - id - object - name - url - event_types - trade_filters - status - verified_at - verification_token_expires_at - failure_count - created_at - updated_at - retry_policy - secret_rotation properties: id: type: integer format: int64 object: type: string const: webhook name: type: string url: type: string format: uri event_types: type: array items: $ref: '#/components/schemas/WebhookEventType' trade_filters: $ref: '#/components/schemas/LargeTradeSubscriptionFilters' status: $ref: '#/components/schemas/WebhookStatus' verified_at: type: string format: date-time nullable: true verification_token_expires_at: type: string format: date-time failure_count: type: integer created_at: type: string format: date-time updated_at: type: string format: date-time retry_policy: $ref: '#/components/schemas/WebhookRetryPolicy' secret_rotation: $ref: '#/components/schemas/WebhookSecretRotation' signing_secret: type: string description: >- Returned only on create, immediate rotate-secret, staged rotate-secret/prepare, or staged rotate-secret/activate. Never returned by list, get, update, delete, verify, or retire. verification: $ref: '#/components/schemas/WebhookVerification' ResponseMeta: type: object required: - request_id - cached - cost properties: request_id: type: string description: >- Unique request ID (req_ prefix). The same value as the X-Request-Id response header, the request's usage accounting row and its log lines. cached: type: boolean cache_age_s: type: integer description: >- Cache age in seconds. Omitted when the response was not cached, and also when it was cached but its age cannot be established (an entry stored before its cache carried a computed instant). Never a placeholder: an unknown age is reported as no value rather than as the cache TTL. cost: type: integer description: >- Advisory request weight (relative compute cost). 1 for simple reads; higher for heavier endpoints. Not a credit/price. ranking_generation: type: integer description: >- Committed PostgreSQL-owned leaderboard generation for the returned rows and cursor. Present on GET /api/v1/leaderboard; omitted on endpoints that do not read this ranking. ranking_as_of: type: string format: date-time description: >- Authoritative RFC3339 timestamp from cache_generations.updated_at for ranking_generation. It is read in the same repeatable-read snapshot as the leaderboard rows and is not request time, cache write time, or row insertion order. directional_source: type: string enum: - live - degraded description: >- Which path produced the team-directional read on this response. Only present on endpoints that compute one (today: GET /api/v1/sports-edge-signals). "live" means the read RAN. "degraded" means it FAILED, so nothing was measured and the ranking fell back to raw conviction. The flag describes the READ, not its consequence: a read that ran and found nothing groupable also leaves the directional fields null, and that is honestly "live" -- the per-signal nulls already say "nothing to enrich here", so this snapshot-level flag carries only what they cannot, namely whether the read ran at all. A degraded response is cached on the shorter degraded TTL so it self-heals. Reported SEPARATELY from ranking_source because the two degradations are independent -- a sharp-money DB miss weakens the ranking DATA, a directional failure removes a ranking WEIGHT -- and a consumer down-weighting a degraded response needs to know which input it lost. Omitted on endpoints that compute no directional read. ranking_source: type: string enum: - live - db_only description: >- Which ranking-data path produced this response. Only present on endpoints that can degrade a ranking (today: GET /api/v1/sports-edge-signals). "live" is the normal path (the current holder pile from the provider batch); "db_only" is the degraded fallback (a truthful but weaker trader_markets ranking) served when the live sharp-money ranking batch is unavailable (a sharp-money DB read failure, not a Polymarket outage) and cached on a shorter TTL, so a consumer can down-weight or skip it. Omitted on endpoints that never degrade. category_skill_source: type: string enum: - live - partial - degraded - unavailable description: >- Whole filtered snapshot category-evidence status before pagination. Operational live always remains partial source coverage. category_skill_model_version: type: string category_skill_taxonomy_version: type: string category_skill_platform: type: string const: polymarket category_skill_scope: type: string const: observed_goldsky_primary_taker_fill category_skill_source_coverage: type: string enum: - partial_whale_threshold_fills - graded_wallet_fills category_skill_observation_started_at: type: string format: date-time category_skill_model_operationally_degraded: type: boolean description: >- Whole-model operational readiness captured with the category model snapshot. Present on category-enriched responses even when the filtered signal list is empty. When true, category_skill_source is degraded and sports-edge-signals uses the shorter degraded cache TTL. category_skill_status_counts: type: object required: - live - insufficient - stale - unknown - degraded properties: live: type: integer minimum: 0 insufficient: type: integer minimum: 0 stale: type: integer minimum: 0 unknown: type: integer minimum: 0 degraded: type: integer minimum: 0 category_skill_base_payload_hash: type: string pattern: ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ description: >- SHA-256 of the funded signal membership/order/rank/cursor vector immediately before category-skill enrichment. Sports-edge-signals only. category_skill_enriched_base_payload_hash: type: string pattern: ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ description: >- Independent SHA-256 recomputation over the same base fields immediately after category-skill enrichment. Equality with category_skill_base_payload_hash proves shadow enrichment did not change funded inputs. Sports-edge-signals only. ApiError: type: object required: - object - error - meta properties: object: type: string const: error error: type: object required: - code - message properties: code: type: string description: >- FROZEN: an existing value never changes meaning. request_timeout (408, #16146) was added the way insufficient_scope was: the handler did not answer inside the server's 30-second timeout. Retry-After and retry_at ride on it only for a safe method (GET, HEAD); a timed-out mutation may have completed, so check its state and reuse its Idempotency-Key. enum: - bad_request - invalid_api_key - subscription_required - forbidden - insufficient_scope - not_found - account_locked - rate_limited - rate_limit_unavailable - internal_error - request_timeout message: type: string doc_url: type: string param: type: string retry_at: type: string format: date-time description: >- The recommended next request instant (RFC3339), always in the future. Present on every retryable error: `pick_not_released`, `rate_limited`, `rate_limit_unavailable`, and `read_model_warming`. Omitted otherwise. The absolute twin of `Retry-After`; prefer the header for the sleep duration. For `pick_not_released`, the earliest of the next scheduled release, the next automatic selector attempt, the operating-window start, or about 60 seconds. See that response. freshness: $ref: '#/components/schemas/FreshnessFailure' reason: type: string enum: - cursor_expired - unknown_endpoint - pick_not_released - trader_not_tracked - read_model_warming - database_unavailable - request_accounting_unavailable - idempotency_in_progress - webhook_delivery_in_progress - webhook_secret_rotation_not_prepared - webhook_secret_rotation_overlap_active - sandbox_api_key - api_key_in_query - subscription_inactive - monthly_quota_exceeded - invalid_query - unknown_query_parameter - invalid_path - invalid_body - unsupported_media_type - payload_too_large - method_not_allowed - ip_rate_limited - ip_throttled - export_expired - freshness_ceiling_unsatisfied description: >- ADDITIVE (#7209). The specific, actionable cause behind `code`, when there is one more specific than the code itself. `code` keeps its published values, so existing clients are unaffected; new clients branch on `reason`. Omitted when the code already says everything we know. pick_not_released: no Pick of the Day is published for the current product day; schedule one request against retry_at instead of polling. unknown_endpoint: the PATH is not a route on this API -- read GET /api/v1, do not retry. trader_not_tracked: the wallet is real and the URL is right, but the trader is outside the HOT/WARM sync tiers -- stop asking for this wallet. cursor_expired: pagination went stale mid-walk -- re-request the first page and continue. read_model_warming: the requested endpoint cannot serve its read model yet; exact causes are endpoint-specific and can include a cold or contended refresh or a dependency that prevented refresh. database_unavailable: the API's database or its connection pool is temporarily unreachable (a connection-class failure, not a query fault); code stays rate_limit_unavailable, nothing is rate-limited, retry after Retry-After / retry_at. idempotency_in_progress: retain the exact Idempotency-Key and request body, then retry shortly. webhook_delivery_in_progress: retry the URL or signing-secret configuration change after the destination's active request completes. request_accounting_unavailable: accounting capacity is unavailable before the handler executes; retry after Retry-After / retry_at. sandbox_api_key: the credential is a sandbox key (oxi_sk_test_) from POST /api/v1/agents/register, which only the sandbox server accepts -- call the sandbox base URL with it, or get a live key or OAuth access token; do not retry it here. api_key_in_query: the key was sent as a ?token= query parameter, which no route reads because URLs land in logs and history; the key itself was not checked -- resend it as Authorization: Bearer. subscription_inactive: the key is valid but the account's Pro subscription has lapsed (402 subscription_required); permanent until a person reactivates at https://0xinsider.com/billing, which the message names -- stop retrying on a schedule and surface the link. The key owner is emailed once per lapse. monthly_quota_exceeded: the account has used the requests its plan includes for the UTC calendar month (429 rate_limited); retry_at and Retry-After name the first of next month, the only retry that can succeed, and the message names https://0xinsider.com/developers, where pay as you go for requests over the quota is turned on. The X-Monthly-Quota-Limit, X-Monthly-Quota-Remaining and X-Monthly-Quota-Reset headers on every authenticated response say how close the account is. invalid_query, invalid_path, invalid_body (400 bad_request, #16146): a query parameter, a path segment or the JSON body did not parse or does not fit the route's schema, so no handler ran; param names the field when the parser named one (a query key, a path segment, a JSON path such as traders[0], or body); fix the request, never retry it as sent. unsupported_media_type (415 bad_request, param content-type): send the body with Content-Type: application/json. payload_too_large (413 bad_request, param body): the body is over 1048576 bytes. method_not_allowed (405 bad_request): the path is a route but not with this method; the Allow header names the methods it serves. ip_rate_limited (429 rate_limited, #16380): the per-address budget every caller behind one IP shares, counted before authentication, is spent; not the key's own window, and the RateLimit-* headers describe that bucket. ip_throttled (429 rate_limited): the address is in a cooldown after sustained over-limit traffic; Retry-After is minutes to days, and a request before it does not shorten the cooldown. meta: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ResponseMeta' WebhookEventType: type: string enum: - large_trade_inserted_v2 - large_trades_inserted - whale_trades_inserted - live_sports_updated - trader_synced - whale_trader_synced - large_positions_updated - wallet_grade_changed - suspicious_trade_flagged - insider_radar_flag_raised - sharp_money_flow_detected - smart_money_flow_detected - export_job_ready - export_job_failed - export_job_expired - export_job_cancelled LargeTradeSubscriptionFilters: type: object additionalProperties: false description: >- All present fields narrow large_trade_inserted_v2 delivery. Grade is observed at publication; ungraded trades do not match min_grade. An empty object matches every large trade. properties: condition_id: type: string description: Raw provider condition ID or mkt_-prefixed market ID. wallet: type: string pattern: ^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40}$ description: Polymarket wallet address; matching is case-insensitive. min_grade: type: string enum: - S - A - B - C - D - F description: S is best; ungraded trades do not match. min_size_usd: type: string pattern: ^[0-9]+(\.[0-9]{1,6})?$ description: Positive USD notional as an exact decimal string. WebhookStatus: type: string enum: - pending_verification - active - disabled WebhookRetryPolicy: type: object required: - max_attempts - terminal_status - retry_horizon_seconds - disable_after_consecutive_failures properties: max_attempts: type: integer const: 8 terminal_status: type: string const: dead_letter retry_horizon_seconds: type: integer const: 7380 description: >- Total wait from a delivery's first failed attempt to its last retry: 60, 120, 240, 480, 960, 1920 and 3600 seconds. A delivery still failing after that is dead_letter. disable_after_consecutive_failures: type: integer const: 8 description: >- Consecutive failed attempts, across all of this endpoint's deliveries, after which the endpoint is disabled and its queued deliveries are dead-lettered. Any successful attempt resets the count. WebhookSecretRotation: type: object required: - status - overlap_expires_at properties: status: type: string enum: - idle - pending - overlap description: >- idle when no staged rotation exists, pending after prepare, and overlap after activate while both signing secrets are accepted. overlap_expires_at: type: string format: date-time nullable: true description: >- When the previous signing secret stops being emitted and accepted. null outside the overlap phase. WebhookVerification: type: object required: - token - expires_at properties: token: type: string description: >- One-time verification token returned only on create or URL change. Pass it to POST /api/v1/webhooks/{id}/verify, which activates the endpoint only when the destination also answers the signed webhook.verification challenge with a 2xx. expires_at: type: string format: date-time FreshnessFailure: type: object required: - max_age_s - data_quality_status properties: max_age_s: type: integer format: int64 minimum: 0 description: The caller's requested whole-response freshness ceiling in seconds. actual_age_s: type: integer format: int64 minimum: 0 description: >- Age in seconds of the oldest stored data_quality.as_of clock, when one is available. as_of: type: string format: date-time description: >- The oldest stored data-quality clock used to calculate actual_age_s, when one is available. data_quality_status: type: string enum: - fresh - partial - unknown - untracked - unavailable description: >- The trader body's whole-response data-quality status. Only fresh can satisfy max_age_s. headers: X-Query-Ignored: description: >- Comma-separated, percent-encoded query names the operation did not publish and therefore ignored in compatible mode. Names are sorted and de-duplicated. schema: type: string X-Effective-Query: description: >- Normalized, percent-encoded query string containing only the recognized names and values applied by the operation. Query names and values use form-urlencoded decoding, where + is a space. Repeated names are retained and sorted by name. A limit outside the operation's published minimum..maximum is reported as the clamped value the page used, so the header states the page size served rather than the one requested. schema: type: string X-Usage-Accounting: description: >- Usage-record persistence for a protected V1 handler response. persisted: confirmed row; failed: write failed; unknown: completion could not be confirmed. Independent of handler success; do not replay successful mutations to repair accounting. Absent before accounting admission and on public routes. The zero-cost /api/v1/usage route also omits it. schema: type: string enum: - persisted - failed - unknown RateLimit-Limit: description: >- Request limit of the budget this request was counted against, for its current window: the API key's per-minute sliding window on an authenticated call; the per-IP budget on a public route and on a refused credential (401, 402, 403, 423), which never reaches the per-key limiter. Standard RateLimit header spelling. schema: type: integer example: 100 RateLimit-Remaining: description: >- Requests remaining in that budget's current window after this response. Standard RateLimit header spelling. schema: type: integer example: 84 RateLimit-Reset: description: >- Seconds until that budget's current window resets. Standard RateLimit header spelling. schema: type: integer example: 42 X-RateLimit-Limit: description: >- Request limit of the budget this request was counted against, for its current window: the API key's per-minute sliding window on an authenticated call; the per-IP budget on a public route and on a refused credential (401, 402, 403, 423). schema: type: integer example: 100 X-RateLimit-Remaining: description: Requests remaining in that budget's current window after this response. schema: type: integer example: 84 X-RateLimit-Reset: description: Unix timestamp when that budget's current window resets. schema: type: integer example: 1710772860 X-Request-Id: description: >- Server-generated request identifier for support and tracing. On every /api/v1 response, including 304, 408, CORS preflights and every error, and always equal to meta.request_id in the body. It is the key of the request's usage accounting row and of every log line the request emitted, so quote either form to support. A client-supplied X-Request-Id request header is ignored: the value is never adopted or echoed. schema: type: string example: req_550e8400 Server-Timing: description: >- Processing time in milliseconds, for example api;dur=12.345. Includes API authentication, quota admission, handler work and response construction. Excludes network transit and streamed body or export-file transfer. The engineering budget is strictly below 250 ms; this header reports observations, not a latency guarantee or a new timeout. schema: type: string example: api;dur=12.345 securitySchemes: bearerAuth: type: http scheme: bearer description: >- Legacy default or named integration API key, or OAuth 2.1 access token, in the Authorization header as `Bearer oxi_sk_live_...` or `Bearer oxi_at_...`. Default keys retain full access; integration keys are limited to their approved read, webhooks, export and usage scopes and expire within 90 days. All credentials share the owner's account limits. Data calls require an active Pro subscription and return live data. A 401 carries WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="https://api.0xinsider.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" (RFC 6750 section 3, RFC 9728). oauth2: type: oauth2 description: >- OAuth 2.1 authorization code flow with PKCE S256 for apps and MCP clients acting for a user. Public clients only (no client secret): register with RFC 7591 at https://api.0xinsider.com/oauth/register or present an https client ID metadata document URL as client_id. Authorization server metadata: https://api.0xinsider.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server. The access token (oxi_at_..., one hour) is sent as `Authorization: Bearer`; refresh tokens rotate on every use. A route outside the token's scopes answers 403 insufficient_scope. Walkthrough: https://0xinsider.com/auth.md. flows: authorizationCode: authorizationUrl: https://0xinsider.com/oauth/authorize tokenUrl: https://api.0xinsider.com/oauth/token refreshUrl: https://api.0xinsider.com/oauth/token scopes: read: >- Read markets, traders, large trades, positions, reports, search, the event stream and every MCP tool webhooks: Create, list, verify, rotate and delete webhook endpoints export: Start, poll and download trader exports usage: Read the caller's API usage counters ```` This documentation is built and hosted on [Mintlify](https://mintlify.com), a developer documentation platform.